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Abstract: This paper considers a constrained discrete-time linear system subject to actuation
attacks. The attacks are modelled as false data injections to the system, such that the total
input (control input plus injection) satisfies hard input constraints. We establish a sufficient
condition under which it is not possible to maintain the states of the system within a compact
state constraint set for all possible realizations of the actuation attack. The developed condition
is a simple function of the spectral radius of the system, the relative sizes of the input and state
constraint sets, and the proportion of the input constraint set allowed to the attacker.
Keywords: Control problems under conflict or uncertainties; Constrained control; Robustness
1. INTRODUCTION
The security of control systems to cyber-attacks has be-
come a pressing issue, owing to the ubiquity of comput-
ers and networks and the vulnerabilities that these intro-
duce (Smith, 2015). In the context of feedback control,
attention has focused on several salient aspects of the
cyber-security problem, including attack detection, syn-
thesis and the analysis of control system stability and
performance under different classes of attack, including
denial of service (DoS), deception and false data injection
(FDI) (Pasqualetti et al., 2013; Teixeira et al., 2015).
In this paper, we study a simple instance of an actuation
attack problem—a type of data injection attack—and, us-
ing set-theoretic methods, develop fundamental conditions
under which it is not possible to robustly defend the sys-
tem. In particular, we consider the problem of maintaining
the states of a constrained linear system within a given
state target set while it is subject to adversarial input
disturbances. We consider that the input constraint set
is partitioned, via a scaling factor, into two portions: the
control input is selected from one portion, and the attack
input from the other, such that the overall input applied
is constraint admissible. The main result of the paper is
the characterization of a lower bound on the constraint
scaling factor such that robust stabilization of the system—
and infinite-time robust constraint satisfaction—for all
realizations of the attack is not possible.
We note that although the state-feedback setting is sim-
pler than that typically considered in the cyber-security
literature—and renders certain aspects of the problem,
such as stealth and detection, trivial—the results we ob-
tain offer some insights into the relative ease of attack
a system according to its dynamics and constraints. The
developed bound on the scaling factor depends, in a nat-
ural way, on the open-loop stability of the system, via its
spectral radius, and the relative shapes and sizes of the
input and state constraint sets. Following intuition, the
bound confirms that more unstable systems with smaller
target sets are easier to attack, in that the proportion of
the input constraint set required by the attacker is smaller,
which may have implications for the signal power and
energy required for a successful attack.
A few other papers have used set-theoretic techniques in
the context of cyber-security. Lucia et al. (2016) propose
a receding-horizon control law utilizing robust reachability
sets in order to mitigate FDI and DoS attacks. Mohajerin
Esfahani et al. (2010) and Mo and Sinopoli (2012) use
reachability analysis in order to characterize the impact
of FDI attacks. The most closely related work, however,
appears to be from outside of this literature: Schulze Darup
et al. (2017) considered a constrained linear (open-loop sta-
ble) autonomous system subject to additive disturbances
selected from scaled disturbance set, and developed lower
and upper bounds on the critical scaling factor at which
robust infinite-time constraint satisfaction is not possible.
The setting considered in the present paper is, however,
more general and the techniques employed are necessarily
different in order to handle the possibility of open-loop
instability of the system.
Notation: The sets of non-negative and positive reals are
denoted, respectively, R0+ and R+. The set of natural
numbers, including zero, is N. For a, b ∈ Rn, a ≤ b applies
element by element. For X,Y ⊂ Rn, the Minkowski sum
is X ⊕ Y , {x + y : x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }; for Y ⊂ X , the
Minkowski difference is X ⊖ Y , {x ∈ Rn : Y + x ⊂ X}.
ForX ⊂ Rn and a ∈ Rn,X⊕ameansX⊕{a}.AX denotes
the image of a set X ⊂ Rn under the linear mapping
A : Rn → Rp, and is given by {Ax : x ∈ X}. The set
−X , {−x : x ∈ X} is the image of X under reflection
in the origin. The support function of a non-empty set
X ⊂ Rn is hX(x) , sup{x⊤z : z ∈ X}. A C-set is a
convex and compact (closed and bounded) set containing
the origin; a PC-set is a C-set with the origin in its interior.
2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a discrete-time, linear time-invariant system,
xk+1 = Axk +Buk, k ∈ N, (1)
where xk ∈ Rn and uk ∈ Rm are the state and input at
time k. The states and inputs are constrained as,
xk ∈ X and uk ∈ U, k ∈ N.
Assumption 1. The pair (A,B) is reachable. X and U are
PC-sets; U is symmetrical about the origin, i.e., U = −U .
The setting considered in this paper is that the system (1)
is subject to attacks on its input. We suppose that these
attacks take place via an attacker gaining access to, and
injecting data into, the control input signal, u. The system
under attack is
xk+1 = Axk +B(vk + ak) (2)
i.e., the input to the system is uk = vk+ak, where ak ∈ U
is the attack signal, and vk ∈ U the control signal provided
by the system controller (the defender). More specifically,
we consider that the attacker is able to use a proportion
α ∈ [0, 1) of the input constraint space, while the defender
is left with the remaining proportion 1− α. For k ∈ N,
ak ∈ αU and vk ∈ (1− α)U.
In this way, the overall input constraint—which typically
represents a hard actuation limit—is respected, yet the
attacker is able to disturb the system and simultaneously
reduce the set of actions available to the defender.
The goal of the attacker is to drive the system states out
of X . The goal of the defender is, naturally, to keep the
state in X , despite the actions of the attacker. Our aim in
this paper is to analyse this simple scenario and develop
fundamental conditions, in terms of the parameter α, on
when an attack is undefendable, i.e., such that there exists
no control law able to maintain the state within X .
3. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS
We begin with some definitions relevant to the problem,
and then link these to known concepts and results in
constrained control. The following refer to the system (2)
and constraints (xk, vk, ak) ∈ X × (1 − α)U × αU .
Definition 2. (Attack and defence sets and strategies).
The admissible attack {defence} set is αU {(1−α)U}, with
α ∈ [0, 1). An admissible attack {defence} is an action
ak ∈ αU {vk ∈ (1− α)U}. An admissible attack {defence}
strategy is a policy x 7→ v ∈ αU {x 7→ a ∈ (1− α)U}.
Definition 3. (Undefendable and defendable attack set).
An attack set αU is said to be undefendable for the
system (2) if, for all x0 ∈ X , there does not exist an
admissible defence strategy that maintains xk ∈ X for all
k ≥ 0. Otherwise, an attack set is said to be defendable.
There is a direct link and equivalence between these defi-
nitions and established concepts in the literature: infinite
reachability, strong reachability and robust control invari-
ance (Bertsekas, 1972; Blanchini, 1999; Kerrigan, 2000).
Definition 4. (Bertsekas (1972)). A set Y ⊂ Rn is said to
be:
(1) Infinitely reachable if there exists a control law µ(·)
and some x0 ∈ Y such that xk ∈ Y and uk = µ(xk) ∈
(1 − α)U for all wk ∈ αU .
(2) Strongly reachable or robust control invariant (RCI) if
there exists a control law µ(·) such that for all x0 ∈ Y ,
xk ∈ Y and uk = µ(xk) ∈ (1− α)U for all wk ∈ αU .
The link to defendability follows trivially.
Lemma 5. The attack set αU is defendable if, and only if,
X is infinitely reachable. X is infinitely reachable if, and
only if, it contains a robust control invariant set C.
Remark 6. In establishing a link between these concepts
and the results later in the paper, we make a tacit
assumption on the information pattern in the problem:
the defender selects vk with knowledge of xk but without
knowledge of wk, while the attacker may have knowledge
of both xk and vk.
This motivates the remainder of the paper. The question
of whether an attack set is defendable or undefendable (as
these concepts are defined) amounts exactly to whether or
not the state constraint set X contains an RCI set. If it
does, then the attack set can be said to be defendable 1
and standard techniques from robust constrained control
can be used to keep the state within X . If it does not, then
an attack set is undefendable, and there does not exist any
defence strategy that keeps the state within X for all time,
accounting for all possible actions of the attacker 2 . Our
more concrete aim is, therefore, to characterize the relation
between the constraint scaling factor α and the existence
of an RCI set within X .
4. ROBUST CONSTRAINT-ADMISSIBLE AND
CONTROL INVARIANT SETS
First we present some known results and new results
regarding RCI sets, with respect to a general linear system
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + Ewk,
(xk, uk, wk) ∈ X × U ×W.
(3)
These are subsequently specialized to the setting described
in the previous section.
4.1 Some known results
The i-step robust constraint-admissible set is the set of all
states that can be kept within X for at least i time steps,
for any disturbance, respecting the input constraints:
Ci :=
{
x : ∃ui ∈ Ui such that xi ∈ Xi for allwi ∈ Wi
}
where ui (respectively wi) is the sequence of i controls
{u0, u1, . . . , ui−1} (disturbances {w0, w1, . . . , wi−1}), the
set Ui , U × · · · × U , with a similar definition for W and
W . The corresponding sequence xi = {x0, x1, . . . , xi} is
obtained by, starting from x0, applying the input sequence
1 Defendability, as it is defined, is a weak notion, in the sense that
it does not imply that all x0 ∈ X can be kept within X.
2 Undefendability says nothing about how the attacker may deter-
mine an admissible attack strategy that achieves the goal of steering
x outside X. This is a less standard control problem than that of the
defender, and is beyond the scope of the paper.
uj and disturbance sequence wj . The definition requires
xi ∈ Xi , X × · · · ×X .
We recall some basic facts about Ci and its limit C∞ (Bert-
sekas, 1972; Blanchini, 1994; Kerrigan, 2000):
Lemma 7. Suppose U is a PC-set and W is a C-set. Then
(i) C0 = X ; (ii) if X is compact [convex], then each Ci
is closed [convex]; (ii) Ci+1 ⊆ Ci; (iii) Ci =
⋂i
j=0 Cj ;
(iv) C∞ := limi→∞ Ci =
⋂∞
i=0 Ci; (v) if 0 ∈ interior(C∞)
then every Ci is a PC-set; (vi) if 0 ∈ interior(C∞), then
C∞ is a robust control invariant set for the system (3)
and constraint set (X,U,W ); (vii) C∞, if non-empty, is
maximal in the sense that it contains all other robust
control invariant sets for the system (3).
To compute Ci, the following recursion holds:
Ci+1 = Q(Ci) ∩X,
with C0 = X,
and where Q(·) is the backwards reachability operation:
Q(Y ) , {x : ∃u ∈ U such that Ax +Bu⊕ EW ⊆ Y }.
More specifically, for the linear time invariant system (3),
Ci+1 = (A)
−1
(
[Ci ⊖ EW ]⊕ (−BU)
)
∩X,
where (A)−1(·) denotes the pre-image of the linear trans-
formation A(·), and exists regardless of whether A is
invertible; for shorthand we will write A−iY to denote
(Ai)−1(Y ).
Lemma 8.
(1) C∞ is finitely determined if and only if there exists
an i∗ <∞ such that Ci∗+1 = Ci∗ .
(2) If C∞ is a PC-set, then such an i
∗ exists.
4.2 Some new results
The aim of the paper is to characterize the existence of
the set C∞ in terms of α. This requires the analysing
of the sequence of sets {Ci}, the dynamics of which
are characterized by Minkowski additions, subtractions,
intersections and preimages, and not readily amenable to
analysis. The following result therefore, which appears to
be new, gives insight into how Ci (and therefore C∞) may
be characterized in terms of sets with simpler dynamics
that are more amenable to analysis.
Proposition 9. The set Ci is bounded as
Ci ⊆
i⋂
j=0
A−jTj
where
Ti+1 = (Ti ⊖A
iEW )⊕Ai(−BU)
with T0 = X.
Remark 10. A special case of this result was reported
by Schulze Darup et al. (2017), who considered an au-
tonomous system xk+1 = Axk + Ewk subject to a distur-
bance from a scaled set αW . In that setting, i.e., without
a control input, what we refer to here as Ci is the i-step 0-
reachability set, and C∞ is the maximal robust positively
invariant set. The authors determine conditions on the
scaling constant α under which C∞ exists. Schulze Darup
et al. (2017) develop the following relation (4), which we
show now to be a corollary of Proposition 9.
Corollary 11. If U = {0} then Ti = X ⊖Ri and
Ci =
i⋂
j=0
(Aj)−1(X ⊖Ri). (4)
Note that in (4) the relation for Ci holds with equality, and
not just the inclusion depicted in Proposition 9. The reason
for the weakening of the equality to mere inclusion is the
behaviour of the Minkowski sum under the intersection:
for sets A, B and C, (A ∩ B) ⊕ C ⊆ (A ⊕ C) ∩ (B ⊕ C)
and not (A ∩ B) ⊕ C = (A ⊕ C) ∩ (B ⊕ C); we used this
fact in the proof of Proposition 9. The latter equality does
hold if the union of convex sets A and B is convex, which
is generally not the case. This, together with the fact that
we consider a more general setting in this paper anyway
(Schulze Darup et al. (2017), because no control input is
available, necessarily restrict their developments to stable
A) means that the methodologies and results of Schulze
Darup et al. (2017) do not apply.
We conclude the section by establishing sufficient condi-
tions for emptiness of the set Ci for some i > 0 and subse-
quently C∞. The results are central to the developments
in the next section, when we specialize to the input-attack
setting.
Proposition 12.
If, for some i⋆ > 0, Ti⋆ = ∅ then Ci = ∅ for all i ≥ i⋆.
Proposition 13.
If, for some i⋆ > 0, Si⋆ = ∅, where
Si , X ⊕

 i−2⊕
j=0
AjB(−U)

⊖

 i−1⊕
j=0
AjEW

 ,
then Ti = ∅ for all i ≥ i⋆.
5. FOR WHICH VALUES OF α IS AN ATTACK SET
UNDEFENDABLE?
We now recast some of the results from the previous
section in the particular setting of the paper, and develop
conditions under which C∞ does not exist.
Specializing the definitions of Ci and Ti to the system (2)
and constraints (xk, vk, ak) ∈ X × (1 − α)U × αU , and
exploiting the symmetry of U , we obtain
Cαi+1 = A
−1([Cαi ⊖ αBU ]⊕ (1− α)BU) ∩X
with Cα0 = X,
and
Tαi+1 = (T
α
i ⊖ αA
iBU)⊕ (1− α)(AiBU)
with Tα0 = X,
where the sets are super-indexed by α to denote their
dependency on this scaling factor. The connection between
the two is, following Proposition 9,
Cαi ⊆
i⋂
j=0
A−jTαj .
In a similar way, the set Si in Proposition 13 may be
specialized to the setting and denoted Sαi .
Our goal is to determine, for each i⋆ ∈ N, the smallest α
for which Cαi⋆ is empty:
αi⋆ , inf{α : C
α
i⋆ = ∅, α ∈ [0, 1]}.
In our main result, Theorem 16, we establish an upper
bound on αi⋆ . We achieve this by characterizing, for each
i⋆ ∈ N, an α¯i⋆ that renders Sαi⋆ empty for all α > α¯i⋆ . By
Propositions 12 and 13, any α > α¯i⋆ ≥ αi⋆ then ensures
that Cαi⋆ is empty. We find that this bound depends on the
relative sizes of the constraint sets X and U , as well as the
relative stability or instability (via the spectral radius) of
the open-loop system.
The following assumption is key to the development and
simplicity of the result:
Assumption 14. The dominant eigenvalue of A is real and
positive.
Let ρA denote the spectral radius of A, and V ,
{v1A, . . . , v
r
A,−v
1
A, . . . ,−v
r
A} be the set of linearly indepen-
dent eigenvectors corresponding to the dominant eigen-
value, plus their additive inverses. Define
HXU (v¯A) , min
v∈V
hX(v)/hBU (v),
which is the smallest among the ratio of support functions
to X and BU evaluated in the directions ±viA, i = 1 . . . r;
define v¯A as the corresponding eigenvector. The following
assumption ensures this is well defined.
Assumption 15. The mapped set BU has non-zero sup-
port in at least one of the directions ±viA, i = 1 . . . r.
Theorem 16. Suppose Assumptions 1, 14 and 15 hold. If,
for some i⋆ ∈ N,
α > α¯i⋆ ,


1 +HXU (v¯A)[1− ρA]− ρ
i⋆−1
A
2− ρi
⋆−1
A − ρ
i⋆
A
ρA 6= 1
HXU (v¯A) + i
⋆ − 1
2i⋆ − 1
ρA = 1
and α¯i⋆ < 1 then C
α
i = ∅ for all i ≥ i
⋆.
Two corollaries of this theorem follow.
Corollary 17. If α > α¯i⋆ when α¯i⋆ < 1 for some i
⋆ ∈ N,
then the attack set αU is undefendable; moreover, the state
is guaranteed to remain in X , for all attack strategies, for
at most i⋆ − 1 steps.
Corollary 18. If
α > α¯∞ ,


1 +HXU (v¯A)[1− ρA]
2
ρA < 1
1
1 + ρA
ρA ≥ 1
and α¯∞ < 1 then C
α
∞ = ∅.
The bounds obtained here provide insight into the relative
ease of attacking a system depending on its dynamics and
constraints. More specifically, the critical scaling factor
depends on the most unstable eigenvalue of the system
and the relative sizes of the state and input constraint
sets in the direction of the corresponding eigenvector. The
result implies that unstable systems are easier to attack
(for example, if ρA > 1 then α¯∞ < 1/2, so the attack set
does not need to be as large as the defence set to render
the system undefendable) and also that (un)defendability
depends on the relative sizes of the sets BU (the mapped
inputs) and X (for example, even if ρA = 0, the system
can be rendered undefendable if α¯∞ < 1, which requires
HXU (v¯A) < 1 =⇒ hBU (v¯A) > hX(v¯A)).
Remark 19. It should be noted that Assumption 14 places
restrictions only on the dominant eigenvalues. The proof
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Fig. 1. Comparison of C3 and its bounding set
⋂3
j=0 A
−jTj
for system S3 with α = 0.1.
(in the Appendix) reveals why: under this assumption, the
long-term critical evolution of the set AiEW = αAiBU ,
by which the intermediate sets are restricted, is in the
direction v¯A, which enables the simple result obtained. It
is possible to extend the result to more general A matrices,
such as those with complex dominant poles. However,
because the long-term growth of the set αAiBU is then
not in single direction, it is more involved to determine
the number of steps after which the set Ti becomes empty.
Remark 20. Although the synthesis of attack strategies is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is interesting to note that
a simple strategy for unstable systems presents itself in
light of the derived bound. Since α¯∞ < 1/2 for all ρA > 1,
the attacker can choose α = 1/2 and—information pattern
permitting—employ the attack strategy a(x, v) = −v(x)
to guarantee that the state leaves X in finite time.
6. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
We illustrate the results of the paper via three example
systems:
S1 : A =
[
0.5 1
0 0.7
]
S2 : A =
[
1 1
0 1
]
S3 : A =
[
1.9 1.1
0.5 1.5
]
where, in each case, B = [0.5 1]
⊤
. The sets X and U are
the unit hypercubes.
First we illustrate Proposition 9. Fig. 1 compares, for
system S3 and a scaling factor of α = 0.25, the three-step
constraint admissible set C3 with the outer bounding set⋂3
j=0 A
−jTj derived in Proposition 9. The inclusion is not
tight, as pointed out in Remark 10.
Next, we illustrate and investigate the result of Theo-
rem 16 and its corollaries. Figure 2 shows, for the systems
S1 to S3, the exact critical scaling factors αi⋆ and the
upper bound α¯i⋆ established in Theorem 16. The exact
scaling factors were found by trial and error, searching
over α ∈ (0, 1) until the smallest value is found for which
the backwards reachability recursion Cαi+1 = Q(C
α
i ) ∩ X
results in Cαi = ∅ for i = i
⋆.
7. DISCUSSION
The derived bound on critical α is merely sufficient and,
as the numerical results indicate, it is not tight—Cαi may
become empty at some smaller i or α than the bound
of Theorem 16 suggests. The sources of conservatism are
threefold:
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(a) Stable system S1
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the bound α¯i⋆ obtained from Theo-
rem 16 with the true bound αi⋆ .
(1) Proposition 12 is sufficient, but not necessary, to
guarantee emptiness of Ci⋆ at some i
⋆. The lack of
necessity arises from the lack of tightness (illustrated
in Fig. 1) in the inclusion relation between Ci and
Ti established in Proposition 9. This itself is, as
explained in Remark 10, because Minkowski addition
is not distributive over set intersections. To avoid this,
and guarantee equality in the relation of Proposition 9
and necessity of the condition in Proposition 12,
strong and unusual assumptions on the system and
constraints would be required.
(2) Similarly, Proposition 13 is merely sufficient to ensure
emptiness of Ti at a given i = i
⋆. The source of
conservatism again arises from the basic properties
of Minkowski addition and subtraction, and in partic-
ular that these operations do not commute: Propo-
sition 13 uses the fact that, for sets A, B and C,
A⊕ C ⊖B ⊇ A⊖B ⊕ C.
(3) Finally, Theorem 16 is sufficient, but not necessary, to
ensure emptiness of Sαi⋆ . The condition was developed
by considering the dynamics of Sαi over times i ∈ N in
only one direction in Rn, the eigenvector associated
with the dominant (real) eigenvalue. It is possible,
but this depends on the system and constraints,
that emptiness of Sαi⋆ could be concluded at some
smaller α than α¯i⋆ by considering other directions.
On the other hand, the long-term change in Sαi will
tend to be dominated by activity in the direction of
the dominant eigenvalue; our numerical results show
relatively good agreement between the theoretical
bound and the exact bound as i⋆ grows.
Finally, it is worth remarking that the developed theoret-
ical bounds are simple to determine, requiring only the
spectral information about the open-loop system and a
couple of support function evaluations on the constraint
sets X and U . In comparison, to determine the exact α(i⋆)
requires a search over the space α ∈ (0, 1), computing the
sequence {Cαi }i≥0 until it is found that C
α
i⋆ is empty.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have analysed a simple instance of a constrained
linear system subject to actuation attacks and, using set-
theoretic methods, derived a lower bound on the sufficient
size of the attack set in order that robust infinite-time
constraint satisfaction can not be guaranteed. The bound
depends, in an intuitive way, on the spectral radius of the
system and size and shape of the constraint sets. Future
work will consider more general instances of A (e.g., with
dominant complex eigenvalues) and a more sophisticated
setting (e.g., with outputs and sensor data injection).
Appendix A. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9
We have C0 = X = A−0T0 and
C1 = A
−1 ([X ⊖ EW ]⊕ (−BU)) ∩X
= A−1 ([T0 ⊖ EW ]⊕ (−BU)) ∩ A
−0T0
= A−1T1 ∩ A
−0T0.
Now C2 = A
−1 ([C1 ⊖ EW ]⊕ (−BU)) ∩X . Denote W ,
EW , U , (−BU), then
C2 = A
−1
(
[(A−1T1 ∩A
−0T0)⊖W]⊕U
)
∩X
= A−1
(
[(A−1T1 ⊖W) ∩ (A
−0T0 ⊖W)]⊕U
)
∩X
⊆ A−1
(
[(A−1T1 ⊖W)⊕U] ∩ [(A
−0T0 ⊖W)⊕U]
)
∩X
= A−2(T1 ⊖AW ⊕AU) ∩A
−1(T0 ⊖W ⊕U) ∩ T0
= A−2T2 ∩ A
−1T1 ∩ A
−0T0,
where the second line follows from (X ∩ Y ) ⊖ Z = (X ⊖
Z)∩ (Y ⊖ Z) (Kolmanovsky and Gilbert, 1998), the third
from (X ∩ Y )⊕Z ⊆ (X ⊕Z)∩ (Y ⊕Z) (Schneider, 1993),
and the fourth from A−1(X ∩ Y ) = A−1X ∩A−1Y . Thus,
C2 ⊆
⋂2
j=0 A
−jTj . Similar arguments establish the same
for all i > 2. ✷
Appendix B. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 12
By Proposition 9, Ci ⊆
⋂i
j=0 A
−jTj . It follows that, if
Ti⋆ = ∅ for some i⋆, then Ci = ∅ for all i ≥ i⋆. ✷
Appendix C. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 13
Consider Ti+1 = (Ti ⊖AiEW )⊕AiB(−U). Applying this
recursively from T0 = X , we obtain
Ti = X ⊖A
0EW ⊕A0B(−U)
⊖A1EW ⊕A1B(−U)
...
⊖Ai−1EW ⊕Ai−1B(−U)
For non-empty sets A, B and C, we have (A ⊖ B) ⊕
C ⊆ (A⊕ C)⊖B. Therefore, for all i ≥ 0,
Ti−1 ⊆ X ⊕

 i−2⊕
j=0
AjB(−U)

⊖

 i−2⊕
j=0
AjEW


Consider how Ti is determined from Ti−1: first, A
i−1EW
is subtracted. It follows that
Ti⋆ = ∅ ⇐⇒ Ti⋆−1 ⊖A
i⋆−1EW = ∅ for some i⋆ ≥ 0.
The latter is true if (but not only if)
X ⊕

i⋆−2⊕
j=0
AjB(−U)

⊖

i⋆−2⊕
j=0
AjEW

⊖Ai⋆−1EW = ∅,
rearrangement of which gives the condition in the hypoth-
esis. ✷
Appendix D. PROOF OF THEOREM 16
Consider
Sαi = X ⊕ (1− α)

 i−2⊕
j=0
AjBU

⊖ α

 i−1⊕
j=0
AjBU


and take the support function of this set in the direction
of the dominant eigenvector v¯A:
hSα
i
(v¯A) ≤ hX(v¯A)
+ (1− α)
i−2∑
j=0
hAjBU (v¯A)− α
i−1∑
j=0
hAjBU (v¯A).
By definition, for a set Y and matrix M , hMY (z) =
hY (M
⊤z). Therefore, and re-arranging the summations,
hSα
i
(v¯A) ≤ hX(v¯A) + (1− 2α)
i−2∑
j=0
hBU ((A
j)⊤v¯A)
− αhBU ((A
i−1)⊤v¯A).
Since v¯A is an eigenvector of A corresponding to a real,
positive eigenvalue λ¯A, A
kv¯A = λ¯
k
Av¯A for all k in N.
Moreover, since λ¯A is the dominant eigenvalue, λ¯
k
Av¯A =
ρkAv¯A. Therefore, hBU ((A
k)⊤v¯A) = ρ
k
AhBU (v¯A) for all
k ∈ N. The previous inequality simplifies to
hSα
i
(v¯A) ≤ hX(v¯A) +

(1− 2α) i−2∑
j=0
ρjA − αρ
i−1
A

hBU (v¯A).
Now consider the geometric series
∑i−2
j=0 ρ
j
A = 1 + ρA +
ρ2A + · · ·+ ρ
i−2
A . There are two cases:
i−2∑
j=0
ρjA =


1− ρi−1A
1− ρA
ρA 6= 1
i− 1 ρA = 1
Consider ρA 6= 1 first. We have
hSα
i
(v¯A) ≤ hX(v¯A)+
[
(1− 2α)
1− ρi−1A
1− ρA
− αρi−1A
]
hBU (v¯A).
It follows that hSα
i⋆
(v¯A) < 0, and therefore S
α
i⋆ = ∅, for
some i⋆ if
hX(v¯A) < −
[
(1 − 2α)
1− ρi
⋆−1
A
1− ρA
− αρi
⋆−1
A
]
hBU (v¯A),
which, given that hBU (v¯A) > 0, may be recast as
αρi
⋆−1
A − (1− 2α)
1− ρi
⋆−1
A
1− ρA
> HXU (v¯A).
Rearranged for α:
α >
1 +HXY (v¯A)(1 − ρA)− ρ
i⋆−1
A
2− ρi
⋆−1
A − ρ
i⋆
A
when ρA 6= 1.
Finally, we consider the case that ρA = 1. Then,
hSα
i
(v¯A) ≤ hX(v¯A) + [(1− 2α)(i− 1)− α]hBU (v¯A).
The set Sαi⋆ is empty for some i
⋆ if
α >
HXY (v¯A) + i
⋆ − 1
2i⋆ − 1
when ρA = 1. ✷
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